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TURKEY BREAKS WITH AXIS IN WAKE OF ALLIED VICTORIES

WITH powerful American armored spearheads pushing toward Paris and the Red Army advancing on Warsaw, the news from the two major European battlefronts is so spectacularly good that it has produced numerous predictions that August may well be the decisive month in winning Allied victory. This optimistic outlook is further encouraged by signs that the revolt inside Germany is still simmering, for on August 4 Hitler was obliged to order a "ruthless purge" of the *Wehrmacht* by a special "court of honor" named by the Fuehrer himself. As a result of these undeniably heartening portents, too many Americans have been prone to forget that the final efforts in so great a struggle require the same hard work as earlier and more uncertain stages of the conflict. On August 4 War Mobilization Director Byrnes felt it necessary to put into force new manpower controls to halt the rush toward peace-time jobs that was endangering military production.

The British public, by contrast, is so much less sanguine about the length of the duration that Prime Minister Churchill found it possible on August 2 to give Parliament an optimistic report on the progress of the war without fearing his words of confidence would immediately cause a slump in vital war work. The chief reason for the more serious spirit prevailing in Britain is undoubtedly the constant reminder, furnished by the devastating robot bombs, of the need for continued and concentrated efforts against the enemy. But another reason, which may be significant in future Anglo-American relations, is the different position of the two Allies in reference to Europe. In his speech Churchill suggested Britain's new proximity to the continent when he described the "ducks" which so marvellously facilitated the Allied landings in France. Although the Prime Minister did not point out the broad significance of this new craft, his British audience probably needed no reminder that the techniques worked out by the

Allies for invading France from the west might in the future be applied in reverse. Now that the great engineering problems involved in the cross-channel invasion have been solved, the British Isles have become almost as much a part of the mainland as though the land bridge of a previous geological age still existed, and Britain can never again attempt—as it did after 1919—to turn its back on Europe. The United States, on the other hand, will emerge from the war physically unscathed, and it will still require an act of intelligent imagination for Americans to realize the extent to which their safety and economic well-being depend on events across the Atlantic. Whether this realization of our interdependence exists will soon be indicated by the amount of understanding Congress, the Administration and the American public show of the Allies' need to liquidate lend-lease in such a way as to insure an orderly transition to peace-time economies.

TURKEY LOOKS TOWARD THE PEACE. On the diplomatic as well as the military front there is reason for Allied optimism. After numerous false alarms during the past five years, the Turkish government on August 2 suspended diplomatic and economic relations with Germany, but stopped short of a declaration of war. From the point of view of the Allies, Turkey's action is not, however, as tardy as might at first appear. Until a year ago Britain and the United States urged the Turks not to forsake their neutrality lest Turkey's involvement in the war result in extending German lines into the strategically important Middle East and constitute a drain on Allied supplies at a time when they were severely limited. Meanwhile, however, the Soviet Union was eager for Turkey's participation as a means of threatening the flank of the German forces on the Black Sea littoral. This difference in Anglo-American and Russian policies toward the Turks was ironed out at Teheran in November 1943, when plans were

made for welding the United Nations forces more closely together. Accordingly, Britain and the United States began putting pressure on Ankara last winter to secure the use of airfields from which to attack Rumanian oil centers and to stop the export of vital raw materials, notably chrome, to the Reich.

As long as the Turks felt the Germans might retaliate for any aid extended to the Allies, they refused all British and American requests, pointing out that their army was largely unmechanized and lacked air power. This spring, however, when Allied military successes on the eastern and Italian fronts reduced the threat of Nazi attack, the Turks agreed to suspend exports of chrome to Germany and to prevent passage of partly dismantled German warships through the Dardanelles. Now that the Germans are clearly and rapidly losing the war in France, as well as in the east and south, the Turks have concluded that it is safe to take another step to assure friendship with the winning Allies. To the Turks such risk of Nazi retaliation as they are still running is considered worthwhile because they have received from the Allies—who hope Turkey's action will encourage Bulgaria and Rumania to get out of the war—promises of a market equivalent to that lost in Germany and shipments of Allied war equipment.

Above all, however, Turkey hopes that its break with Germany will help secure it a voice at the peace conference. When the new European settlement is made, the Turks will be vitally interested not only in the Bulgar frontiers and the balance of power in the Balkans but in the important question of the Dardanelles. Since Russia has again appeared as a leading world power, it may be expected to be more interested in the straits than at any time in the past twenty-five years. At the end of World War I Soviet leaders renounced the claims to the Dardanelles their Tsarist predecessors had staked in a war-time secret treaty with the Allies and thus prepared the

way for the establishment of international control, which lasted until Turkey secured the League's permission in 1936 to exercise virtually sole control. In the future, however, it is possible that Russia may revive its historic request for unrestricted entry to the Mediterranean via the straits, and the Turks undoubtedly believe their chances for maintaining control of this important passageway will be strengthened by their current overtures to the Allies.

SPOTLIGHT ON THE MIDDLE EAST. Turkey, at the eastern end of the Mediterranean, focuses attention on the Middle East, which may all too easily revert to its pre-1914 position as "the area of discord"—in Sumner Welles' apt phrase. Although war-time changes in the Allies' relationships in the Near East are largely unnoticed by our popular press, transformations of long-range significance are occurring. In 1939 the Middle East, as a whole, was predominantly a British preserve and the chief problems, therefore, were those existing between the British and the native Arabs. The war, however, has greatly changed this situation, for the influence of the United States has grown enormously thanks to lend-lease and the establishment of military bases. Although most of these American activities will end with the war, the United States will have important interests in the oil of the region and will probably continue to desire rights to air bases. Meanwhile the U.S.S.R. has opened new trade routes across the area to secure Allied supplies, and it may be expected that the Russians will have permanent interests in Persian oil. In the future, therefore, the Middle East will be a crucial testing ground of inter-Allied unity. In adjusting the overlapping claims of the Big Three in this area the international oil agreement just negotiated between Britain and the United States should offer a model solution and substitute for unworkable spheres of influence.

WINIFRED N. HADSEL

FILIPINOS FACE SERIOUS POST-LIBERATION PROBLEMS

Whether the Philippines are invaded at an early date, or temporarily by-passed while our heaviest blows are aimed farther north, final ejection of the Japanese from the islands will create important political problems for our government and that of the Philippine Commonwealth, now headed by Sergio Osmeña, who became President on the death of Manuel Quezon on August 1, 1944.

INSIDE THE PHILIPPINES. The present condition of the Philippines, as indicated by trustworthy reports, may be summarized as follows:

(1) The Japanese have no hold whatever on large areas in the Visayas and Mindanao, where their garrisons are small (except in Davao) and are confined to the ports. Most of their forces are massed in Luzon. In the southern islands, guerrilla bands led

by both Filipinos and Americans are active, and in some provinces free civil governments are functioning. The Moros are well supplied with firearms obtained from Philippine Army units before their surrender. By "scraping the bottom of the barrel," the Japanese were able to muster only 2,000 troops for a recent punitive expedition in the south, the results of which were negligible. The former Philippine constabulary probably has less than 10,000 effectives (the Japanese say 40,000), and is so little trusted that each man is issued only one clip of ammunition at a time by Japanese supply officers.

(2) Japan's "printing press" pesos have deteriorated until they are worth only half as much as the "typewriter" pesos issued by the guerrillas, and the puppet government has been forced to raise wages

repeatedly to keep pace with inflation prices.

(3) Food is scarce in Manila and the "cash-crop" provinces. In normal times the islands produced about four-fifths of their starch-food requirements, and imported rice from Saigon. The Japanese wrecked the distribution system by ill-advised regulations, and have cut off the importation of rice. In many areas, thus, there is considerable malnutrition. Most of the sugar output has been used by the Japanese for the manufacture of alcohol. Filipino farmers now grow patches of cane and produce a crude brand of sugar for their own use. The copra and coconut oil industry is also stagnant, a small amount of oil being used for fuel and soap. Attempts to grow cotton, perhaps forced by the Army on a skeptical Department of Agriculture, have failed and the culture is being abandoned.

(4) Transportation is at a minimum. Steamships have been replaced on the inter-island runs by sailboats and motor-barges. The only fleet of gasoline-driven trucks in the islands is used to haul copper from mines in North Luzon. Charcoal and oil-fueled engines are used on other motored vehicles, even by the Japanese Army.

(5) Malaria has been widely spread by Filipino troops who contracted the disease on Bataan. During confinement in Camp O'Donnell (Tarlac Province) these troops were given indoctrination courses in the blessings of Japanese rule and then paroled to their homes. They have thus acted as carriers of malaria, and quinine has not been available to combat it. On the other hand, the Japanese have continued vaccination in the towns, and the smallpox rate is low. Neither has there been an epidemic of bubonic plague, as the Philippines have virtually no communication with any country except Japan. Some cholera is reported, though not on a large scale.

(6) Captured American officers of the rank of colonel and higher have been sent to Formosa or Japan. Lower ranks have had severe experiences in Philippine prison camps. Civilians at the Santo Tomas camp have been better treated. Nearly all Americans formerly permitted to live outside the camp have been moved into it—voluntarily in some cases as they could not obtain sufficient food outside except at black market prices. There is some malnutrition among older civilians, but children and young people have usually been able to cope with the diet. About 800 American and European men have been moved from Manila to Los Baños.

COLLABORATIONISTS AND GUERRILLAS.
American re-occupation of the Philippines will pre-

sumably require a transition period of military government before the Commonwealth is restored to authority. The Commonwealth is not equipped to deal with immediate problems of reconstruction, and it would seem that American assistance and supervision would be essential for some time.

Politically, difficult problems will be presented by the Filipino "collaborationists" and the guerrilla governments. Of 1,000 leading Filipino officials, about one-fourth are reported as accepting appointments by the puppet government. Under Philippine law, they will not be able to plead "duress" as an excuse. Nearly all the collaborationists, however, are important figures in the Nationalist party, of which the late President Quezon and President Osmeña were the leaders. (General Aguinaldo, also a collaborationist, is not considered a significant factor by either Japanese or Filipinos, if only because of his advanced age.) The guerrilla governments are understandably bitter toward the collaborationists, and some are reported as none too friendly to the government-in-exile. Most of them have announced their determination to play a controlling part in the restored Commonwealth government, and to deal summarily with the collaborationists.

President Osmeña is probably as well fitted by experience and temperament to deal with this situation and with the American government as any Filipino. While former President Quezon was an outstanding example of the Spanish-Malay, Mr. Osmeña typifies some of the best traits of the Filipino of Chinese ancestry. He is not lacking in balanced judgment, a sense of fairness and a talent for conciliation. More cautious and patient than Mr. Quezon, he has a reputation for keeping his engagements, and although far less aggressive, he has shown firmness when the occasion demanded. Nor can it be forgotten that his wife is still a prisoner in Manila, and that two of his three sons were shot by the Japanese. He may find it both necessary and expedient to purge his party of collaborationists and to welcome many of the guerrilla leaders to a large share in the Commonwealth government. A prompt and peaceful solution of these problems will hasten the complete independence which has been pledged to the Filipinos, and which their heroism has so richly earned.

WALTER WILGUS


Hitler's Generals, by W. E. Hart. Garden City, Doubleday, Doran and Company, 1944. \$2.75

A Reichswehr officer under the German Republic gives a personal view of the war leaders.

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Washington News Letter



MANNERHEIM MAY MODIFY FINN'S PRO-GERMAN POLICY

As a result of the Finnish Parliament's action on August 1, calling Field Marshal Carl Gustav Mannerheim to the Presidency, his attitude toward the prospect of European peace takes on special significance. He is known to be unfriendly to Soviet Russia, but probably would not sacrifice Finland to that dislike. Yet he is celebrated for his unfriendliness toward Germany. There is a story that in his pre-war travels to the French Riviera, Mannerheim would make the journey by sea rather than take the railroad which crossed German territory. Even during the military crisis in Finland provoked by the Soviet capture of Viipuri and their offensive against Karelia on June 10, he is reported to have declined an invitation from the German government to visit Berlin.

GERMANS OPPOSE FINNISH PEACE. If Mannerheim should now sue for peace with Russia, this would discourage such wavering satellites as Rumania and Bulgaria from continuing in the war, and would perhaps intensify dissension inside Germany. Peace anywhere within the European Fortress would strangle the slight hopes of leading Nazis for personal survival. Although these hopes are entirely dependent on protracting the war as long as possible, German radio reports described the elevation of Mannerheim with satisfaction. One broadcast said that Mannerheim now has the same powers in Finland as Hitler has in Germany.

In fact, the selection of Mannerheim for the Presidency ends a period of intense pro-Germanism in the Finnish government, even though the German Minister in Helsinki, Wilpert von Blucher, and German military leaders in Finland may create difficulties for Mannerheim should he seek peace. The Parliamentary action climaxed a growing restlessness, due to Finland's exhaustion after long fighting and a deepening realization that what President Roosevelt on March 16 termed the "hateful partnership" with Germany could only lead to "national suicide," as the British Broadcasting Company had warned on March 15.

The internal struggle between Finnish groups strangely fascinated by the prospect of sinking side by side with Germany and groups anxious for peace became marked after the Soviet government's announcement on April 23 that negotiations to end the war with Finland had collapsed. Three leaders of the

government identified themselves completely with German policy—President Risto Ryti, Prime Minister Edwin Linkomies and Foreign Minister Henrik Ramsay. On June 28 a DNB broadcast declared that Nazi Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop had completed a visit to Finland during which the two governments had reached a "complete concert of opinions." The United States on June 30 broke off diplomatic relations with Finland, but that only steeled the government's determination to merge its fortunes with Hitler's. Linkomies on July 2 broadcast against a separate peace, and on August 1 it was disclosed that Ryti had written to Adolf Hitler pledging Finland not to seek a separate peace.

Despite the dictatorial hold which the Ryti-Linkomies government exercised over public opinion, dissatisfaction with their policy became so plain that Ryti resigned on August 1. Overshadowing the stubborn decisions of his cabinet were the more telling facts of Russian advances into the heart of Poland and toward East Prussia, the Red Army's arrival on the southern shore of the Gulf of Riga, and the progress of American and British armies in France and Italy. On August 4 Mannerheim took the oath of office, and Linkomies and his cabinet resigned. The new President hid his intentions behind such cryptic statements as "the difficulties which we must conquer in order to secure the future are great." However, the sentence gains meaning from his warning on March 19 that the Finnish Army could not hold back a Russian offensive. The new government's problem is to extract itself from the German grasp, and Mannerheim is not hampered by Ryti's pledge against a separate peace.

EARLY PEACE THE WISE COURSE. Finland's only wise course is to realize that its hopes of profit from alliance with Germany are dead, and to understand that all countries must now endeavor to fit themselves for participation in the new world organization to be established in place of the New World Order which was to have followed Hitler's conquests. Every day that Finland continues to help Germany will increase the price it will have to pay for its policy. The United Press has carried a report that the Soviet government is giving Finland until August 12 to seek peace.

BLAIR BOLLES

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